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The Impact of Microcredit on Agricultural Technology Adoption and 
Productivity: Evidence from Randomized Control Trial in Tanzania 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of microcredit on the adoption of technology and productivity 
of rice cultivation in Tanzania. Collaboratively with BRAC, a globally-known microfinance 
institution, we offered microcredit specifically designed for agriculture to randomly selected 
farmers. We estimate the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) as well as the local average treatment 
effect (LATE) of microcredit, by using the eligibility to the program as an instrumental 
variable (IV). Overall, we find statistically weak or even null evidence that the BRAC program 
increases the use of chemical fertilizer. Also, credit use does not result in an increase in paddy 
yield, profit from rice cultivation, or household income for borrowers. Our results from 
sub-sample analyses suggest that credit does not increase the fertilizer use by those who have 
better access to irrigation water as they have already applied the amount of fertilizer near to the 
recommended level. On the other hand, credit increases the fertilizer use by those who have 
limited access to irrigation water and have previously used little fertilizer. However, possibly 
due to the poor yield response to fertilizer, the increase in chemical fertilizer use does not 
result in higher yield for them. We also observed similar phenomenon for the comparison 
between trained and non-trained borrowers before the intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
Agricultural development is indispensable for poverty reduction and food security in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The slow growth of crop productivity in SSA is in sharp contrast to 
the experience of the Asia during the Green Revolution, where there has been a rapid increase in 
paddy yield due to the diffusion of fertilizer-responsive modern varieties (MVs) of rice (David 
and Otsuka 1994; Evenson and Gollin 2003). One of the reasons for this low productivity 
growth in SSA is the low adoption rates of modern inputs, such as chemical fertilizer and MVs. 
Research also points out that in addition to adopting modern inputs, improving agronomic 
practice is also important to increase paddy yield in SSA (Nakano et al. 2013; Nakano et al. 
2016; Otsuka and Larson 2013; Otsuka and Larson 2016).  
Lack of access to credit is often identified as one constraint on the adoption of 
agricultural technology (Crawford et al. 2003; Croppenstedt et al. 2003; Feder et al. 1985; 
Guirkinger and Boucher 2008; Morris et al. 2007; Moser and Barrett 2006; Zeller 1998). Poor 
households without sufficient collateral tend to be excluded from formal financial services, due 
to high transaction costs and imperfect information, which makes formal banks reluctant to offer 
services to them (Ghatak 1999; Gíne 2011; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). As a consequence, poor 
farmers may be unable to invest in new technology or profitable income generating activities 
(Conning and Udry 2007). 
Microfinance has attracted growing attention as a means of overcoming such situations. 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs), which are semi-formal financial institutions that offer a wide 
range of services including collateral-free microcredits, microsavings, and microisunrances, 
have increased in number and outreach. The number of MFIs has continued to increase and the 
number of clients who have benefitted from microfinance reached roughly 211 million by 2013 
(Microcredit Summit Champaign 2015). Microfinance has generated considerable enthusiasm 
and hope for ensuring sustainable financial inclusion and poverty alleviation, culminating in the 
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Nobel Prize for Peace, awarded in 2006 to Mohammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank for their 
contribution to reducing world poverty. 
Accordingly, many studies have been conducted to examine the impact of MF, 
especially microcredit, on the welfare of the poor in developing countries (e.g. Morduch 1999; 
Pitt and Khander 1998; Roodman and Morduch 2014; Takahashi et al. 2010; see also Benerjee 
2013; Karlan and Morduch 2010; Kono and Takahashi 2010; van Rooyen 2012 for review).1 
Also, an increasing number of studies evaluate the impact of microcredit by conducting 
randomized control trials (RCT) (Angelucci et al. 2015; Attanasio et al. 2015; Ausburg 2015; 
Banerjee et al. 2015 a; Banerjee et al. 2015 b; Crépon et al. 2015; Karlan and Zinman 2009; 
2010; 2011; 2018; Tarozzi et al. 2015) and by quasi-experimental methods (Kaboski and 
Townsend 2005; 2012). These studies often examine the effect of microcredit on various 
outcomes such as consumption, new business creation, and business and household income, as 
well as other human development indicators including education, health, and women’s 
empowerment (see Bauchet et al. 2011 for a review). Most of these studies show that microcredit 
increases business investments but has a relatively small impact on income or human 
development measurements, and thus, microcredit is not a silver bullet for poverty reduction. 
However, the number of experimental studies that examine the impact of microcredit on 
the adoption of agricultural technology and productivity is relatively small. This is partly 
because most microcredit targets small business holders or entrepreneurs as their borrowers. For 
example, Giné and Yang (2009) and Karlan et al. (2014) examine the impact of the microcredit 
with and without microinsurance. Ashraf et al. (2009) also examine the impact of a package of 
export promotion services with and without credit on the production of export crops and income 
in Kenya. They found that credit increases the participation in the program but does not translate 
into higher income. These studies do not, however, examine the sole impact of microcredit on 
                                            
1 Here we only focus on the study on microcredit rather than microfinance in general. See Bauchet et al. 
(2011) for a review on the impact microfinance including microinsurance and microsavings. 
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agricultural productivity. To our knowledge, the only two studies that examine the direct impact 
of microcredit on agricultural technology by using RCT are Hossain et al. (2018) and Beaman et 
al. (2014). Hossain et al. (2018) found that access to credit has positive effects on the adoption of 
MVs of rice as well as paddy yield, yet does not increase household income or expenditure. 
Beaman et al. (2014) observed that access to credit increases the input use but does not result in 
higher net revenue from the crop. 
This paper contributes to the literature by conducting RCT to examine the impact of 
microcredit on the technology adoption and productivity of rice cultivation in Tanzania. Unlike 
previous studies, we examine the impact of microcredit not only on input use but also the 
adoption of improved agronomic practices, which are important to increase the productivity 
and profitability of rice cultivation. Collaboratively with BRAC, a globally-known MFI, we 
provide microcredit, which is specifically designed for agriculture (referred to as the BRAC 
program hereafter) to randomly selected farmers in two irrigation schemes. Eligible farmers 
were invited to a credit program for a loan of about 50USD. Fifty percent of the credit was 
received as a fertilizer voucher, while the remaining 50 percent was received in cash.2  
We use two-year panel data, which was collected before and after the intervention. We 
specifically focus on the impact of microcredit on the adoption of technologies such as modern 
varieties (MVs), chemical fertilizer, and improved agronomic practices as well as the 
productivity of rice cultivation. While we randomized the invitation to the microcredit program, 
participation in the program is not random. Thus, we estimate the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) 
as well as local average treatment effect (LATE) of microcredit by using the eligibility to the 
program as an instrumental variable (IV).  
                                            
2 As we will discuss later, we provided a basic one-day training for the recipient of the credit on rice 
cultivation. Our analysis, however, suggests that this training was not effective to the extent that it 
changes our results. 
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Overall, we find statistically weak or even null evidence that the BRAC program 
increases the use of chemical fertilizer. Also, credit use does not result in an increase in paddy 
yield or profit for borrowers. We conduct subsample analyses comparing borrowers in an 
irrigation scheme with relatively good access to water to those who are not. We also compare 
borrowers who have been trained and non-trained before the credit intervention. Our results 
suggest that credit use does not increase fertilizer use by those who have better access to 
irrigation water as they had already applied the amount of fertilizer near to the recommended 
level. On the other hand, credit increases fertilizer use by those who have limited access to 
irrigation water and had used little fertilizer. However, possibly due to the poor yield response to 
fertilizer, the increased use of chemical fertilizer does not result in higher yield for them. We also 
observed similar phenomenon comparing trained and non-trained borrowers before the 
intervention. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study site, data 
collection methods, and implementation of the BRAC program. Section 3 discusses 
methodology for our analysis. In section 4, we discuss the estimation results on the impact of 
microcredit. Section 5 presents the conclusion and policy implications.  
 
2. Study Site and Data  
2.1 Study Site  
Three rounds of surveys were conducted in two irrigation schemes, called Ilonga and Chanzuru, 
located about 15km from Kilosa town, in Kilosa District, Morogoro Region, Tanzania. By 2013, 
the total developed area of the Ilonga irrigation scheme was 120 hectares, supporting about 600 
households, and the Chanzuru irrigation scheme had 400 hectares of developed area with 725 
households. There are two cropping seasons in the study area: the main season from November 
to May and the short rainy season from July to September. During the main season, farmers grow 
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rice in irrigated plots. They also grow other crops such as maize, beans, sunflower, and sesame in 
upland plots in both the main and short rainy seasons. Since few farmers grow rice in the short 
rainy season, our analysis focuses only on rice cultivation in the main season. 
Despite the proximity to each other, Ilonga has some unique characteristics in 
comparison to Chanzuru, including the presence of the Ministry of Agriculture Training Institute 
(MATI), and the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI-Ilonga). Before microcredit intervention, 
JICA had also conducted training (called TANRICE training) on rice cultivation technologies 
in Ilonga in 2008 (Nakano et al. 2018). Furthermore, the Ilonga irrigation scheme is located in 
the upper streams of the river than Chanzuru. Ilonga has three cemented channels, while 
Chanzuru has only one channel that is not cemented. The Chanzuru irrigation scheme has no 
drainage system, which makes it difficult for farmers to control the water availability in their 
plots as well. Thus, farmers in Ilonga have better access to both training and extension services 
and irrigation water. 
 
2.2 Data  
The data collection was conducted in three rounds of surveys, from 2010 to 2012. The baseline 
survey was conducted from September to November 2010. In this survey, 412 households were 
randomly selected from the roster of farmers growing rice in both irrigation schemes. The 
second survey was conducted from August to September 2011, followed by the intervention of 
the BRAC program from November 2011 to May 2012. Due to the budget constraint, however, 
we could reach to only 358 households in the second round of our survey. 
During the first and second survey, we ask farmers to identify the most important plot 
(referred to hereafter as the sample plot).  In the sample plot, we collected the detailed 
information about rice cultivation, and compute variables related to technology adoption, 
production costs, and productivity. In addition to rice cultivation in the sample plot, other 
household-level variables including basic household characteristics and income related 
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variables were collected.  Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are shown 
in Appendix Table 1. 
During the intervention, the 412 households who had been interviewed in the first 
survey were randomly assigned into two groups. The first group consisted of 208 households 
which were eligible to the credit from BRAC, and the second group consisted of 204 
non-eligible households. The randomization was done at the household level in each village. In 
2012, all sample households (i.e., eligible, borrower, non-eligible) were revisited again in a 
follow-up survey that aimed to collect data to assess the impact of the BRAC program. However, 
17 households were not accessible, three of which were eligible and 14 were non-eligible.  In 
addition to this, during our data cleaning, we found seven households who identified as 
borrowers though they were not eligible. Since this is most likely because of enumeration 
mistakes, we omitted these households from our sample. In addition to this, we omitted one 
household with an extreme value in important variables. As a result, our sample size in 2012 
becomes 387.   
In Appendix Table 2, we estimated an attrition probit model, where the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable which takes one if observation is included in the sample in 2012. 
The independent variables are eligibility to the program as well as other household 
characteristics in 2010. We observe that the eligibility to the program has a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting that eligible farmers were less likely to be attrited from our 
sample. Since sample attrition did not occur randomly, this can potentially cause biases for our 
estimates. We will take this problem into consideration in our following analyses. 
During the follow-up survey in 2012, we asked farmers in the BRAC program similar 
questions as the previous survey about the plot, where they apply most of the fertilizer received 
from BRAC. For those who did not join the BRAC program, we asked about the same plots in 
the first and second rounds of survey. Thus, our data is not plot-level but household-level panel 
data. Although we collected the data in three rounds of survey, we utilize the data collected in 
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2010 and 2012. This is because our analysis is mainly based on the cross-sectional variation 
created by RCT in 2012 and we use the data in 2010 mostly to control for the baseline 
characteristics. 
 
2.3 Details of the BRAC program 
The details on the microcredit given during the intervention are given here as follows. After 
randomization, a list of eligible households was handed to the administration of the BRAC 
Kilosa branch, who were in charge of the rest of the activities. The BRAC community organizer 
visited eligible households and explained the terms and conditions for borrowing from the 
BRAC program. If eligible farmers agreed, they could participate in the BRAC program. At the 
end of consultation, four groups of borrowers whose members were jointly responsible for 
each other’s loan were formed. The group size is relatively large at 15 to 20 people in each, 
though it is questionable if this group liability was strictly followed or taken seriously by the 
farmers.  
The total amount of the loan to each borrower was 80,000 Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) 
which was approximately equal to 50USD. Borrowers were required to borrow both cash and 
chemical fertilizer.  The amount of loan allowed to be received in cash was Tsh 40,000 
(approximately 25USD). Borrowers received money before the beginning of the cultivation 
season, so that they could use it for hiring agricultural labor or purchasing other inputs. The 
remaining amount (Tsh 40,000) was received as a fertilizer voucher.3 The voucher was effective 
at two fertilizer dealers in the village and farmers could exchange the voucher for fertilizer at the 
market price. Approximately, farmers could obtain 26kg of UREA by using this voucher. It is 
                                            
3 In order to minimize the possibility that credit is used for different purposes other than agriculture, we 
provided half of the credit as a fertilizer voucher. This would have affected the take-up rate of this 
program. Note, however, that the take up rate of this project is about 39%, which is not low compared to 
other microcredit programs, which typically provide loans in cash. It should also be noted that we 
provide relatively small amount of credit in order to avoid overuse of chemical fertilizer by those who 
have not adopted fertilizer-responsive modern varieties. 
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important to note that borrowers had little incentive to side sell fertilizer, as they bought it at 
market price and have to repay the interest, unless non-eligible farmers were willing to pay 
higher interest to them. It is also notable that the average number of cultivated rice plots per 
household is 1.3, while that of maize is 0.3. This suggests that the likelihood fertilizer would be 
diverted to other plots cultivated by the borrower is low. 
The duration of the loan was one cultivating season and the interest rate was 25% (They 
have to repay Tsh 100,000 after harvest). Understanding that farmers receive most of their 
income after harvesting, they were required to repay 80% of the total payment including the 
interest after the harvest. This is a special feature of our program customized for agriculture, as 
usual microcredit program requires frequent repayment soon after the lending starts. 4 The 
remaining 20% of the total payment was supposed to be repaid in weekly installments during the 
cultivation period, so that the basic policy of microcredit of frequent repayment to ensure the 
reimbursement is still maintained. The self-reported repayment rate was 92.5% at the period of 
our follow-up survey, which was conducted a few months after the harvesting season. 
Before giving loan to farmers, BRAC conducted one-day training on the proper use of 
fertilizer, modern varieties, and basic improved agronomic practices. The training was given 
only to farmers in borrower groups. Being absent in the training, however, did not risk farmer’s 
eligibility to continue with a program. Although this could give additional benefit to the 
borrowers, our main results do not change even if we restrict the sample to those who attended 
this training, suggesting that this training was not effective to the extent that it impacted our 
results. 
 
                                            
4 Field et al. (2013) and Takahashi et al. (2017) examine the uptake and the impact of microcredit with 
and without a grace period for credit in non-agricultural settings. 
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3. Methodology 
We estimate the average effects of the participation in the BRAC program on technology 
adoption, paddy yield, income, and profit from rice cultivation. Let Y1i be the outcome of 
household i when they participate in the BRAC program, and let Y0i be the outcome of the 
same household if they do not participate in the BRAC program. We also assume that Di is a 
dummy variable that takes one if a household is a borrower and zero if it is not. Then, the 
average effect of the credit can be defined as E (Y1i|Di = 1) – E (Y0i|Di = 1) or E (Y1i -Y0i|Di = 
1). Here, E (Y0i|Di = 1) is hypothetical and unobservable as the same household cannot be a 
borrower and non-borrower at the same time. If the program participation is randomly assigned, 
however, E (Y0i|Di = 1) would be equal to E (Y0i|Di = 0) and we can estimate the average 
impact of the program as  
ATT = E (Y1i|Di = 1) - E (Y0i|Di = 0). 
The problem, here, is that although the eligibility to the program can be randomly 
assigned, we cannot force households to take credit. Thus, borrowing or not is endogenously 
determined by the households. To cope with this selection problem, we first estimate an 
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, which can be written as  
ITT = E (Y1i|Zi = 1) - E (Y0i|Zi = 0), 
where Zi is a dummy variable that takes one if a household is eligible to the program and zero 
otherwise. Although actual participation to the program (Di) is endogenously determined, 
eligibility to the program is randomly assigned. Thus, we can get unbiased estimates for ITT. 
ITT, however, captures the impact of being offered the program, rather than being an actual 
borrower. 
To address this issue, we also estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). 
Let D1i and D0i be the values of Di when Zi = 1 and when Zi = 0, respectively. Obviously, Di 
and Zi are closely associated with each other because only the eligible households could take 
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credit from BRAC. LATE is the average treatment effect on those who joined the BRAC 
program because of the eligibility to the program, while they did not do so if they were not, 
and defined by;  
LATE= E[Y1i -Y 0i | D1i ≠D0i] .  
As Imbens and Angrist (1994) show, if Y1i, Y0i, D1i, and D0i, are independent of Zi and 
if D1i ≥ D0i, for all i (monotonicity), LATE can be estimated as coefficient β in a regression 
model, Yi = α+ βDi + εi, by using Zi as an IV.  Following Frison and Pocock (1992) and 
McKenzie (2012), we also estimate the Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) regression for the 
robustness check, by including the outcome variable at the baseline as the control variable in 
estimating both ITT and LATE. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the adoption of technologies, paddy yield, income and 
profit from rice cultivation of eligible and non-eligible farmers, and borrowers.  New 
technologies include the use of modern varieties of rice, the application of chemical fertilizer, 
improved bund construction, plot leveling, and transplanting in rows. Improved bund 
construction entails piling soil solidly around the plots, while plot leveling involves flattening 
the ground for better storage and equal distribution of water on paddy fields. Transplanting 
seedlings in rows allows rice growers to control plant density precisely and remove weeds easily. 
Income is defined as revenue5 minus the paid-out costs of hired labor, rental machinery, draft 
animals, and other purchased inputs. Profit is defined as revenue minus the paid-out costs and 
imputed costs of self-produced seeds, family labor, and owned machinery and animals, 
                                            
5 When farmers do not sell the product, we impute the value of output by using the average price of the 
product in the village. We also impute the costs of family labor and owned machinery by using the 
average wage rate and rental price in the village. 
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evaluated at village market prices. Profit, thus, can be interpreted as the return on land and 
management practices.  
Eligible and non-eligible famers for the BRAC program were randomly selected. 
Among eligible farmers, there are farmers who decided to take the loan (referred to as 
borrowers), and those who opted not to borrow despite being eligible (referred to as eligible 
non-borrowers). Overall, in our sample, among 205 eligible farmers, 80 farmers actually took a 
loan, and thus, the take-up rate was about 39%. This is relatively high compared to other 
microcredit related studies, whose take up rate varies from about 10% to 30% (Angelucci et al. 
2015; Banerjee et al. 2015a; Banerjee et al. 2015b; Beaman et al. 2014; Crépon et al. 2015; 
Hussain et al. 2018; Tarozzi et al. 2015).  
We conduct t-test comparisons between eligible and non-eligible farmers and between 
borrowers and non-eligible farmers, whose results are shown by asterisks.  In addition to this, 
we conducted a sub-sample analysis to compare borrower and non-eligible farmers in the Ilonga 
and Chanzuru irrigation schemes as well as borrowers and non-eligible farmers who have been 
trained and not before the credit intervention. 
First, we find that the chemical fertilizer use, the adoption rate of the improved bund, as 
well as input costs is significantly higher for borrowers than non-eligible farmers for the total 
sample. The borrowers on average use 78.0 kg of fertilizer per hectare while non-eligible 
farmers use 53.2 kg. The borrowers do not achieve, however, higher paddy yield or revenue than 
non-eligible farmers. The paddy yield for the borrowers is 3.2 tons per hectare while that of 
non-eligible farmers is 3.1 tons per hectare. As a result, there is no statistically significant 
difference in profit and income between these two groups. It is also notable that the total labor 
cost is significantly lower for the BRAC borrowers than non-eligible farmers. 
We also compare the paddy yield, the adoption of technologies, and profit of borrowers 
and non-eligible households in the Ilonga and Chauzuru irrigation schemes. In Ilonga, where 
farmers have relatively good access to irrigation water, even non-eligible households apply 
 
13 
 
chemical fertilizer of 84.2 kg per hectare while non-eligible farmers in Chanzuru apply only 20.8 
kg per hectare on average.6 The non-eligible famers in Ilonga achieve a paddy yield of 3.8 tons 
per hectare whereas the paddy yield of Chanzuru is 2.4 tons per hectare. This shows that due to 
favorable conditions in Ilonga, including better access to irrigation water and extension services, 
farmers in Ilonga apply more chemical fertilizer and achieve higher yield even without any 
intervention from BRAC. It is also notable that the adoption rate of modern variety is 39-54% in 
Ilonga, while that in Chanzuru is between 9-11%.  This suggests the possibility that the 
fertilizer response to yield is lower in Chanzuru than in Ilonga as more farmers are using non 
fertilizer-responsive traditional varieties. 
In Ilonga, borrowers apply 94.3 kg of chemical fertilizer, while non-eligible farmers 
apply 84.2 kg per hectare, a statistically insignificant difference. On the other hand, in the 
Chanzuru irrigation scheme, borrowers apply 61.7 kg of chemical fertilizer, whereas 
non-eligible farmers apply 20.8 kg per hectare. The difference between two groups are 
statistically highly significant. The paddy yield, however, is not statistically different between 
borrowers and non-eligible farmers either in Ilonga or Chauzuru. Borrowers in Chanzuru 
achieve higher profits than non-eligible households due mainly to lower labor costs, while there 
is no significant difference in profit between borrowers and non-eligible households in Ilonga. 
Regarding the comparison between borrowers and non-eligible farmers who were 
trained and non-trained before the intervention, we observe similar tendency between Ilonga and 
Chanzuru. Namely, even non-eligible farmers who were trained before apply as much as 94.2 kg 
of chemical fertilizer per hectare, while non-eligible farmers who were not trained apply only 
41.7 kg per hectare. This suggests that trained farmers apply more fertilizer even without any 
credit intervention than those who were not. Trained borrowers do not apply more fertilizer than 
trained non-eligible farmers even when they use credit. On the other hand, non-trained 
                                            
6 The recommended level of fertilizer application is 125-250 kg per hectare. 
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borrowers apply more chemical fertilizer than non-eligible farmers by about 33 kg per hectare 
(41.7 kg per hectare vs. 75.0 kg per hectare). This suggests that credit effectively increases the 
fertilizer application of those who were not trained before and, thus, have used little fertilizer 
without credit intervention. 
We also show the fertilizer use in 2010 and 2011 for all categories of farmers. We do not 
observe any significant differences between eligible and non-eligible farmers, which suggest 
that the balancing is successfully done. Another important point is that there is no significant 
differences between the fertilizer use in 2011 and that in 2012 for non-eligible farmers. This 
implies that there is little spill-over or diversion of credit from eligible farmers to non-eligible 
farmers in 2012 at least in the form of chemical fertilizer. If there is any spill over, the fertilizer 
use for non-eligible farmers would also increase compared to the last year. We do not observe 
any significant differences between borrowers and non-eligible farmers in total household 
income or income from other sources for both total and sub-sample analyses. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results 
In order to estimate ITT and LATE on the impact of microcredit, we first examine the balance 
between eligible and non-eligible farmers of the baseline characteristics by conducting t-tests 
between eligible and non-eligible farmers. As shown in Appendix Table 3, we find no 
statistically significant difference in terms of household characteristics at the baseline between 
eligible and non-eligible households, except the value of household assets and the adoption 
rate of leveling, which are significant at 10%. This suggests that randomization was generally 
successful and we control for baseline household characteristics and the adoption of 
technologies at baseline, respectively for ITT and LATE estimation in the following analyses, 
so that we control for the initial differences in these two variables.   
We also present the first stage regression results in Appendix Table 4. Here, the 
dependent variable is being a BRAC borrower and the main independent variables are the 
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dummy variable which takes one if a farmer is eligible for the BRAC program as well as other 
household characteristics. We find that our instrument of being eligible (denoted as Z during 
model specification) has a highly significant coefficient, and thus, can be used as IV of being 
borrowers. We do not find any significant impact from other baseline household characteristics 
on being a BRAC borrower.  
Table 2 reports the estimation results of ITT and LATE with and without the outcome 
variable at the baseline. We control for basic household characteristics, including total land 
holdings (ha), value of household assets (USD), number of adult household members, years of 
schooling of household head, female household head dummy, and age of household head in all 
the estimation models. For ITT, we report only the coefficient of being eligible farmers, while 
the coefficient of being BRAC borrowers instrumented by being eligible farmers are reported for 
LATE. We report the robust standard error without clustering because we only have two villages 
and use a randomly assigned variable as IV (Cameron and Miller 2015). Since we have a 
relatively large number of outcome variables, we also conducted multiple hypotheses testing for 
significant variables, following Romano and Wolf 2005, whose results are indicated by + in the 
table.7 
Both ITT-ANCOVA and LATE-ANCOVA estimates show that the participation in the 
program increases the amount of chemical fertilizer by about 8-22 kg and this is significant at 
10%. This significant effect, however, becomes insignificant after we conduct multiple 
hypotheses testing. The results of ITT and ANCOVA without outcome variables at the baseline 
also suggest that there is no significant impact of credit on fertilizer use. There is also no 
significant treatment effect for the adoption of other technologies such as adoption of MVs, 
                                            
7 We classify the variables into following family: (1) modern input use (chemical fertilizer use and the 
adoption of MVs), (2) adoption of improved agronomic practices (the adoption of improved bund, plot 
leveling, and transplanting in rows), (3) productivity (paddy yield, revenue, income, and profit of rice 
cultivation per hectare), (4) costs (total input costs, labor costs, machinery and animal costs per hectare, 
use of credit other than BRAC). 
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improved bund construction, plot leveling, or transplanting in rows. Also, all the results show 
that the participation to the program does not increase paddy yield for borrowers. In terms of 
revenue, costs, and profit of rice cultivation, we observe that participation in the training 
significantly decreases the total labor cost; this is still significant even after we consider multiple 
hypotheses testing.8 In all other variables, we do not observe any significant treatment effect of 
being BRAC borrowers. 
 
4.3 Attrition bias and bounds test 
Since our sample may suffer from attrition problem, we estimate the lower and upper bounds of 
our treatment effect by following Karlan and Valdivia (2011). Namely, we examined whether 
these attritors were the most successful farmers, slightly successful farmers (+ 0.25 standard 
deviation and 0.1 standard division from non-attired households), slightly less successful 
farmers (-0.1 standard deviation, and -0.25 standard deviation from non-attrited farmers) or the 
least successful farmers. We also conduct multiple hypotheses testing here, as we did in Table 2.  
The results are shown in columns (1) to (7) in Table 3 respectively.9 We observe that although 
the effect of borrowing is significant for chemical fertilizer use, it becomes insignificant if we 
                                            
8 The reduction of total labor cost is mainly due to the decreased family labor costs for the borrowers. 
One possible explanation may be that since borrowers could use credit to invest in other economic 
activities such as off-farm business, they reallocate their labor from rice cultivation to other activities. 
Since we do not have any data on family labor use for other activities, it is difficult for us to examine 
this point empirically. Note, however, that as we will discuss later, there is no impact of credit use on 
income from other sources, suggesting that such labor reallocation, if any, was not large to the extent 
that it increases income from different sources. 
9 In Table 3, (1) imputes the minimum value of each variable in the nonattrited treatment distribution to 
attrited in the treatment group and the maximum value of nonattrited control distribution to attrited in 
the control group. (2) Imputes the mean minus 0.25 s.d. of the nonattrited treatment distribution to 
attrited in the treatment group and the mean plus 0.25 s.d. of the nonattrited control detrition to attrited 
in the control group. (3) Replaces 0.25.s.d. in column (2) with 0.1. s.d. (4) The unadjusted results. (5) 
Imputes the mean plus 0.10 s.d. of the nonattrited treatment distribution to attrited in the treatment group 
and the mean minus 0.10 s.d. of the nonattrited control distribution to attrited in the control group. (6) 
Replaces 0.1.s.d. in column (5) with 0.25. s.d. (7) Imputes the maximum value of each variable in the 
nonattrited treatment distribution to attrited in the treatment group and the minimum value of 
non-attrited control distribution to attrited in the control group. We assume all eligible households 
become borrowers as we cannot predict who would be borrowers among attrited households.  
 
17 
 
conduct multiple hypotheses testing. We observe a negative and significant effect of credit on 
total labor costs. Generally, we do not observe any significant effect on other outcome variables 
except for the first and seventh cases. The results are qualitatively the same as our main 
estimation results, except for the first and seventh case where we assume that the attritors are the 
least or most successful farmers. Since it is a strong assumption that all the attritors achieve 
minimum or maximum value of non-attritors, the results show that our estimates are largely 
robust even after considering the attrition bias. 
 
4.4 Sub-Sample Analyses 
Our estimates from the total sample found weak or even null evidence of an increase in chemical 
fertilizer and did not observe any significant increase in yield or profit. In order to further 
examine the impact of credit use, we conduct two types of subsample analyses. One compares 
the treatment effects in the Ilonga and Chanzuru irrigation schemes separately, while the other 
compares the treatment effects of those who had received rice related training before the 
intervention and not. Note that, as we discussed earlier, farmers in the Ilonga scheme enjoy 
better access to irrigation water, and thus, apply more fertilizer than farmers in Chanzuru even 
without a credit intervention. Also those who were trained prior to the study apply more than 
those who were not even if they were non-eligible for the credit program.  
As Table 4 shows, borrowers in Ilonga did not increase chemical fertilizer while 
borrowers in Chanzuru did so by 17 to 42 kg per hectare. The results are significant and robust 
for both ITT and LATE estimation even after conducting multiple hypotheses testing. On the 
other hand, we do not observe a significant treatment effect for paddy yield or other technology 
adoption either in Ilonga or Chauzuru.  In our comparison between trained and non-trained 
farmers, non-trained borrowers increase chemical fertilizer while trained borrowers do not. 
Neither of them, however, achieve higher yield than the control group. 
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These results suggest that those who have favorable access to irrigation water and 
extension services apply large amounts of fertilizer even without credit intervention. Thus, they 
do not increase chemical fertilizer application even when they receive credit. On the other hand, 
those who have unfavorable access to irrigation water or extension services apply little fertilizer 
without credit intervention. The borrowers in those unfavorable area or with limited knowledge 
on the use of fertilizer increase their use of chemical fertilizer. However, they do not enjoy 
higher yield possibly because of a low yield response to fertilizer due to the unfavorable 
conditions. We observed negative impact of credit on income from rice cultivation for trained 
farmers, for which we do not have a clear explanation. 
 
4.5 Impact on Household Income 
We find that borrowers in Ilonga as well as farmers trained before the program do not increase 
the use of chemical fertilizer by joining the credit program. This suggests the possibility that 
fertilizer or money borrowed is used for other purposes such as cultivation for other crops and 
non-farm business. In order to examine such a possibility, we examine the impact of credit on 
total household income, crop income other than from the sample plot, livestock income, and 
business and wage income. As you can see from Table 5, credit does not increase income any 
from these sources. Although there is a possibility that the loan was used for different activities, 
it was not effective in increasing income from these activities.10 
 
                                            
10 Our complementary study suggests that borrowers increase chemical fertilizer use for maize plots and 
earned higher income from maize in Chanzuru. This increase, however, was not enough to increase total 
crop income or household income significantly. See Magezi and Nakano (2019) for more detailed 
analyses on the impact of BRAC program on different sources of income and expenditure. 
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5. Conclusion 
We analyze the impact of microcredit on technology adoption and productivity of rice 
cultivation by conducting RCT in Tanzania. Using eligibility for the BRAC credit program as an 
IV, we examine the impact of being a borrower on the adoption of technology and productivity 
of rice cultivation. Overall, we found weak or even null evidence of an increase in chemical 
fertilizer and did not observe any significant increase in yield, profit or household income. The 
insignificant impact of credit on fertilizer use or yield is consistent with the findings of Njeru et 
al. (2016), who found that credit use did not increase chemical fertilizer or paddy yield in Kenya. 
Admittedly, however, the statistical power of our analyses is not as high as many other 
microcredit impact evaluations. Thus, the results should be interpreted with care.   
We conduct a sub-sample analyses and compare borrowers and non-borrowers in 
irrigation schemes with and without good access to irrigation water. We also compare borrowers 
and non-borrowers who were trained before the intervention and those who were not. Our results 
show that those who were in the irrigation scheme with good access to water have applied a 
relatively high amount of chemical fertilizer, which is near to the recommended level, even 
without credit use. Thus, even after they receive credit, they did not increase the use of chemical 
fertilizer. Also, those who were trained before the credit intervention apply a relatively large 
amount of chemical fertilizer and do not increase it even if they join credit program. On the other 
hand, farmers with relatively unfavourable access to irrigation water or non-trained farmers 
significantly increase the chemical fertilizer use by using credit. The increased fertilizer use, 
however, did not results in the increase for yield or profit for these farmers. Although the reason 
for this is not conclusive, low yield response to fertilizer due to the unfavorable conditions or 
limited knowledge may be a possible reason, given that the adoption rate of fertilizer responsive 
MVs is low in these areas.  If this is the case, our results support the argument of Kijima and 
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Otsuka (2010), who emphasize the importance of the extension services prior to the input market 
development. 
Credit also did not increase total household income or income from other sources, such 
as other crop income, livestock income, and business income. This is consistent with previous 
experimental studies who found no or little positive impact of agricultural microcredit or 
microcredit in general on the welfare of the households (Angelucci et al. 2015; Attanasio et al. 
2015; Ausburg 2015; Beaman 2014: Crépon et al. 2015; Hossain et al. 2018; Tarozzi et al. 2015). 
Our results cast doubt on the positive impact of microcredit, even after considering the 
fungibility, under the circumstances without reclusive economic activities. Combining these 
results, our study suggests that facilitating access to credit without considering other constraints 
may not be effective to increase the agriculture productivity as well as the welfare of small-scale 
farmers.  
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Table 1: Paddy yield, technology adoption, factor payments and household income for non-eligible and eligible households and credit 
borrower 
Variable Total sample Ilonga Chanzuru Trained Non-trained 
  Non-eligible Eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2012 53.2 61.3 78.0*** 84.2 94.3 20.8 61.7*** 94.2 82.1 41.7 75.0*** 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2011 50.7 54.1 63.2 86.3 108.7 16.1 20.0 94.7 116.0 40.9 43.0 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2010 44.4 41.0 43.5 74.5 77.7 13.0 9.4 89.2 93.6 30.3 23.0 
Modern variety (%): 2012 24.7 23.3 32.7 39.5 54.4 9.3 11.1 43.9 52.3 20.1 23.0 
Adoption of improved bund (%): 2012 6.0 7.8 12.5* 7.5 10.0 4.5 15.0** 6.1 13.6 7.0 12.7 
Adoption of leveling (%): 2012 38.5 39.0 40.0 33.3 32.5 43.8 47.5 30.3 31.8 43.4 43.6 
Adoption of transplanting in row (%): 2012 13.2 13.2 15.0 24.7 25.0 1.1 5.0 27.3 31.8 9.3 7.3 
Yield (t/ha): 2012 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.8 3.5 2.4 2.8 4.0 3.3 2.9 3.0 
Revenue (USD/ha): 2012 1326.7 1267.6 1330.8 1596.9 1430.1 1044.4 1231.6 1643.1 1373.1 1260.4 1293.2 
Income (USD/ha): 2012 896.5 833.1 855.2 1071.6 911.1 713.7 799.2 1163.2 790.2 838.5 876.8 
Profit (USD/ha): 2012 401.6 403.8 516.5 625.5 562.7 167.5 470.4** 713.6 460.7 338.6 526.4 
Total input costs (USD/ha): 2012 89.0 97.3 118.9** 126.8 156.1** 49.5 81.8*** 125.0 159.2 79.1 102.9 
Total labor costs (USD/ha): 2012 775.2 705.4* 622.0*** 763.1 628.9** 787.8 615.1*** 708.2 660.6 791.4 603.3*** 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha): 2012 61.0 61.2 73.3 81.5 82.4 39.6 64.3 96.3 92.7 51.3 60.6 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program  (USD): 2012 15.7 18.3 12.2 27.5 18.2 3.4 6.2 22.3 9.1 16.0 13.1 
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Table 1: Paddy yield, technology adoption, factor payments and household income for non-eligible and eligible households and credit 
borrower cont. 
 
Total sample Ilonga Chanzuru Trained Non-trained 
 
Non-eligible Eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower Non-eligible Borrower 
Total household income (USD): 2012 888.7 837.3 888.2 790.9 783.1 990.9 993.4 1405.9 1076.4 789.8 830.4 
Total crop income (USD): 2012 546.9 549.9 641.6 606.6 604.3 484.6 678.9 681.1 761.1 530.4 598.0 
Total livestock income(USD): 2012 34.8 24.2 29.5 37.7 18.1 31.8 41.0 58.9 23.2 32.6 33.6 
Business and wage labor income (USD): 2012 307.0 263.2 217.0 146.6 160.7 474.6 273.4 665.9 292.1 226.8 198.8 
Observations 182 205 80 93 40 89 40 33 22 129 55 
Source: Author. 
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% in t-test comparison between eligible and non-eligible households and between 
borrower and non-eligible households. 
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Table 2: Estimated results on the impact of being a BRAC borrower in 2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ITT 
ITT 
(ANCOVA) LATE 
LATE 
( ANCOVA) 
Chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha) 8.07 8.77* 20.68 22.47* 
 
(5.246) (4.881) (13.113) (12.163) 
The adoption of modern variety (%) -0.58 -0.78 -1.49 -2.01 
  (3.911) (3.651) (9.922) (9.266) 
Adoption of improved bund (%) 2.81 2.94 7.19 7.51 
 
(2.542) (2.555) (6.403) (6.424) 
Levelled plot (%) -0.14 -1.09 -0.35 -2.80 
 
(5.006) (4.990) (12.675) (12.664) 
Plot transplanted in rows (%) 0.88 0.94 2.26 2.41 
  (3.318) (3.236) (8.399) (8.182) 
Yield (ton/ha) -0.15 -0.15 -0.38 -0.40 
 
(0.175) (0.168) (0.445) (0.428) 
Revenue (USD/ha) -66.98 -67.34 -171.60 -172.54 
 
(73.290) (70.468) (187.054) (179.406) 
Income (USD/ha) -73.68 -71.04 -188.77 -181.67 
 
(68.891) (66.906) (175.710) (169.668) 
Profit (USD/ha) -2.25 0.91 -5.77 2.32 
  (71.968) (71.588) (182.264) (180.263) 
 
27 
 
Total input costs (USD/ha) 6.89 6.59 17.66 16.87 
 
(9.370) (8.997) (23.581) (22.588) 
Total labor costs (USD/ha) -73.56** -75.19** -188.45** -191.91** 
 
(31.488)+ (31.277)+ (79.474)+ (78.730)+ 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha) 1.94 3.09 4.96 7.86 
 
(7.159) (6.985) (18.096) (17.516) 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program (USD) 2.31 2.15 5.93 5.51 
  (7.191) (7.120) (18.239) (18.001) 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.1 in multiple hypotheses testing. We control for household characteristics (total 
land holdings (ha), value of household asset (USD), number of adult household members, years of schooling of household head, female household head 
dummy, and age of household head) in all the estimation models. Sample size is 387.  
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Table 3: Bounds for the IV estimates of the impact of being a BRAC borrower (ANCOVA) 
 
 Lower bounds Unadjusted Upper bounds 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Min 0.25 s.d. 0.1 s.d.   0.1 s.d. 0.25 s.d. Max 
Chemical fertilizer (kg/ha)  -27.07* 22.84** 25.53** 23.56** 29.12*** 31.81*** 46.96*** 
 
 (15.20) (11.11) (11.12) (12.004) (11.19) (11.27) (12.31) 
Modern variety  -20.77** -1.44 0.38 -1.99 2.81 4.64 9.81 
 
 (9.49) (8.26) (8.23) (8.972) (8.22) (8.24) (8.36) 
Improved bund (%)  -19.59** 4.75 5.86 4.63 7.33 8.44 11.08* 
 
 (8.19) (5.91) (5.90) (6.523) (5.89) (5.90) (6.09) 
Plot leveling (%)  -19.94 -5.49 -3.24 -0.56 7.33 2.01 10.82 
 
 (12.23) (11.66) (11.63) (12.726) (5.89) (11.65) (11.91) 
Transplanting in row (%):   -25.96*** -4.01 -2.45 -4.15 -0.38 1.17 4.87 
   (8.91) (7.32) (7.31) (7.940) (7.32) (7.35) (7.54) 
Yield (t/ha)  -2.66*** -0.60 -0.52 -0.56 -0.40 -0.32 0.57 
 
 (0.61) (0.39) (0.39) (0.429) (0.39) (0.39) (0.45) 
Revenue (USD/ha)  -1,191.15*** -262.03 -226.38 -227.05 -178.85 -143.21 222.60 
 
 (266.19) (165.12) (164.75) (180.241) (164.76) (165.15) (186.79) 
Income (USD/ha)  -1,069.80*** -267.40* -234.82 -240.00 -191.38 -158.79 280.11 
 
 (236.93) (157.63) (157.35) (173.085) (157.40) (157.78) (187.51) 
Profit (USD/ha)  -935.36*** -45.89 -11.56 -27.49 34.21 68.53 563.01*** 
 
 (253.65) (165.10) (164.93) (186.909) (165.16) (165.67) (201.92) 
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Total input costs (USD/ha)  -156.69*** 20.32 24.66 30.56 30.46 34.80 73.92*** 
 
 (44.75) (22.04) (22.02) (22.843) (22.04) (22.10) (26.05) 
Total labor costs (USD/ha)  -571.88*** -211.15*** -197.26*** -180.07** -178.75** -164.86** 37.09 
 
 (109.44)++ (71.58)++ (71.35)++ (79.598)+ (71.23)+ (71.27)+ (83.55) 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha) 
 -49.66** 6.68 9.94 8.30 14.30 17.56 35.45** 
 (20.33) (15.81) (15.78) (17.424) (15.79) (15.83) (16.69) 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program (USD) 
  
 -170.60*** 1.16 4.38 4.99 8.67 11.89 22.20 
 (41.79) (16.91) (16.90) (17.055) (16.93) (16.99) (18.14) 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ++ p<0.05, + p<0.1 in multiple hypotheses testing. We control for household 
characteristics (total land holdings (ha), value of household asset (USD), number of adult household members, years of schooling of household head, female 
household head dummy, and age of household head) in all the estimation models. Outcome variables at baseline are also controlled. Sample size is 412.  
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Table 4: ANCOVA estimates on the impact of being a BRAC borrower in 2012 (Sub-sample analysis) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ilonga Chanzuru Trained Non-trained 
VARIABLES ITT LATE ITT LATE ITT LATE ITT LATE 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha) 3.86 9.65 16.56*** 42.20*** -10.92 -18.24 14.03** 37.64*** 
 
(8.096) (19.797) (5.626)++ (13.158)+++ (13.682) (21.018) (5.573)++ (14.136)++ 
Modern variety (%) -4.01 -10.06 1.25 3.18 4.80 8.26 -2.06 -5.55 
  (6.252) (15.615) (4.004) (9.957) (11.010) (17.439) (4.016) (10.720) 
Adoption of improved bund (%) 1.20 2.97 3.90 9.79 3.96 6.72 2.76 7.44 
 
(3.499) (8.412) (3.558) (8.616) (5.883) (9.083) (3.121) (8.232) 
Adoption of leveling (%) 0.31 0.79 0.32 0.82 9.82 16.80 -5.03 -13.60 
 
(6.933) (17.000) (7.250) (18.251) (10.896) (17.636) (6.037) (16.153) 
Adoption of transplanting in row (%) -2.02 -5.09 2.38 6.11 4.22 7.08 1.40 3.76 
  (6.291) (15.487) (1.810) (4.513) (10.434) (16.191) (3.419) (9.073) 
Observations 194 194 193 193 71 71 278 278 
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Table 4: ANCOVA estimates on the impact of being BRAC borrower in 2012 (Sub-sample analysis) cont. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Ilonga Chanzuru Trained Non-trained 
VARIABLES ITT LATE ITT LATE ITT LATE ITT LATE 
Yield (ton/ha) -0.41 -1.04 0.06 0.15 -0.76 -1.27* -0.12 -0.31 
 
(0.274) (0.677) (0.188) (0.466) (0.494) (0.761) (0.181) (0.484) 
Revenue (USD/ha) -178.79 -447.33 28.09 71.57 -319.24 -530.13* -52.50 -141.73 
 
(113.446) (279.252) (81.261) (201.018) (194.027) (297.883)+ (78.334) (209.483) 
Income (USD/ha) -174.34 -440.51 5.22 13.27 -408.79** -686.10** -33.43 -90.47 
 
(109.718) (272.478) (76.995) (191.133) (179.713)++ (282.801)++ (73.696) (196.585) 
Profit (USD/ha) -126.60 -325.75 109.86 278.37 -268.60 -457.88 43.92 118.34 
  (112.748) (285.305) (88.887) (215.390) (180.412) (283.671) (81.882) (215.436) 
Total input costs (USD/ha) 8.96 22.51 8.50 21.50 34.15 57.39 2.82 7.52 
 
(16.512) (40.355) (7.704) (18.608) (34.302) (54.077) (8.963) (23.340) 
Total labor costs (USD/ha) -62.24 -158.52 -77.21 -196.23* -91.93 -158.36 -91.37** -245.47*** 
 
(43.140) (107.424) (47.288) (116.443) (73.318) (118.249) (36.135)++ (95.237)++ 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha) -5.73 -13.92 9.53 24.24 -0.67 -1.18 2.92 7.86 
 
(10.329) (24.590) (9.587) (23.826) (21.517) (34.884) (7.224) (19.096) 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program (USD) -0.18 -0.45 7.85 19.95 -2.14 -3.66 0.03 0.09 
  (12.525) (30.708) (5.534) (14.126) (11.944) (18.878) (8.920) (23.683) 
Observations 194 194 193 193 71 71 278 278 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. +++ p<0.01, ++ p<0.05, + p<0.1 in multiple hypotheses testing. We control for 
household characteristics (total land holdings (ha), value of household asset (USD), number of adult household members, years of schooling of household head, 
female household head dummy, and age of household head in all the estimation models.) Outcome variables at baseline are also controlled.  
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Table 5: ANCOVA estimates on the impact of the BRAC credit program on household income 
 
Total Sample Ilonga Chanzuru Trained Non-Trained 
 
LATE ANCOVA LATE ANCOVA LATE ANCOVA LATE ANCOVA LATE ANCOVA 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Total household income (USD) 7.35 -18.94 374.43 332.44 -504.41 -513.20 -678.55 -653.27 279.75 271.00 
 
(334.549) (333.139) (446.176) (444.451) (480.192) (478.769) (699.096) (712.574) (378.571) (374.233) 
Total crop income (USD) -34.61 -88.45 -89.14 -137.50 -28.79 -92.81 53.59 -19.23 -86.54 -117.93 
 
(132.919) (124.861) (197.373) (183.677) (169.426) (156.734) (226.155) (213.550) (154.035) (146.257) 
Total livestock income(USD) -22.32 -20.70 -50.52 -48.14 -3.28 -1.78 -55.70 -55.16 -6.85 -7.16 
 
(21.938) (21.838) (37.010) (36.792) (28.791) (28.756) (35.392) (34.547) (28.434) (28.086) 
Business and wage labor income (USD) 64.29 62.64 514.09 494.28 -472.33 -471.60 -676.43 -553.49 373.14 377.49 
  (292.410) (289.917) (395.245) (393.042) (415.351) (414.842) (631.563) (590.268) (332.343) (329.332) 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for household characteristics (total land holdings (ha), value of household 
asset (USD), number of adult household members, years of schooling of household head, female household head dummy, and age of household head in all the 
estimation models.) Outcome variables at baseline are also controlled. Sample size is 387.  
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Mean S.D. Min Max 
Number of adult household members: 2010 2.76 1.35 1.00 11.00 
Total land holdings (ha): 2010 0.37 0.88 0.00 12.55 
Value of household assets (USD): 2010 361.00 570.90 10.00 7577.00 
Ilonga village: 2010 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age of household head: 2010 47.81 14.68 20.00 87.00 
Female household head (dummy): 2010 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Years of schooling of household head: 2010 5.91 2.90 0.00 16.00 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2012 57.51 60.06 0.00 247.50 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2010 42.60 61.16 0.00 370.60 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2011 52.53 64.20 0.00 370.60 
Adoption of improved bund (%): 2012 6.98 25.51 0.00 100.00 
Adoption of leveling (%): 2012 38.76 48.78 0.00 100.00 
Adoption of transplanting in row (%): 2012 13.18 33.87 0.00 100.00 
Modern variety: 2012 23.98 40.44 0.00 100.00 
Yield (t/ha): 2012 3.05 1.85 0.00 10.63 
Revenue (USD/ha): 2012 1295.00 769.80 0.00 4723.00 
Income (USD/ha): 2012 863.00 700.80 -985.10 3743.00 
Profit (USD/ha): 2012 402.70 740.00 -1442.00 3615.00 
Total input costs (USD/ha): 2012 93.38 99.66 0.00 777.20 
Total labor costs (USD/ha): 2012 738.20 307.80 0.00 2153.00 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha): 2012 61.08 73.62 0.00 305.30 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program  (USD): 2012 17.09 68.31 0.00 666.70 
Total household income (USD): 2012 861.50 1314.00 -337.20 11386.00 
Total crop income (USD): 2012 548.50 531.40 -337.20 3414.00 
Total livestock income (USD): 2012 29.20 87.55 0.00 848.00 
Business and wage labor income (USD): 2012 283.80 1160.00 -84.00 10533.00 
Source: Author. 
Sample size is 387.  
  
 
34 
 
Appendix Table 2: Attrition probit in 2012 
  
 VARIABLES Non-attired in 2012 
    
Eligible 1.030*** 
 
(0.231) 
Ilonga village: 2010 -0.072 
 
(0.208) 
Total land holdings (ha): 2010 -0.111 
 
(0.094) 
Value of household asset (thousand USD) :2010 0.044 
 
(0.147) 
Number of adult HH members: 2010 -0.021 
 
(0.070) 
Years of schooling of HH head: 2010 -0.025 
 
(0.030) 
Female household head (dummy): 2010 -0.240 
 
(0.262) 
Age of HH head: 2010 0.005 
 
(0.009) 
Constant 1.337*** 
 
(0.465) 
  Observations 412 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix Table 3: Balancing test between eligible and non-eligible households 
  Non-eligible Eligible 
Household Characteristics   
Total land holdings (ha): 2010 0.33 0.40 
Value of household asset (USD): 2010 412.63 315.19* 
Number of adult household members: 2010 2.83 2.70 
Years of schooling of household head: 2010 5.96 5.86 
Female household head (dummy): 2010 0.21 0.20 
Age of household head: 2010 48.70 47.01 
Yield & Technological adoption   
Yield (t/ha): 2010 2.21 2.20 
Use of chemical fertilizer (kg/ha): 2010 44.39 41.00 
Modern variety: 2010 18.16 18.67 
Adoption of improved bund (%): 2010 8.24 5.85 
Adoption of leveling (%): 2010 64.84 72.68* 
Adoption of transplanting in row (%): 2010 20.33 18.54 
Factor Payment   
Revenue (USD/ha): 2010 637.91 630.44 
Total input costs (USD/ha): 2010 53.38 52.35 
Total labor costs (USD/ha): 2010 748.59 752.91 
Total machinery and animal costs (USD/ha): 2010 25.72 20.81 
Income (USD/ha): 2010 417.26 411.15 
Profit (USD/ha): 2010 -180.49 -191.43 
Use of credit other than BRAC Program (USD): 2010 9.27 18.67 
Observations 182 205 
Source: Author. 
*** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% in t-test comparison 
between eligible and non-eligible households. 
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Appendix Table 4: Results of first stage regression on being a BRAC borrower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES BRAC borrower (dummy): 2012 
    
Eligible for BRAC program (dummy): 2012 0.390*** 
 
(0.035) 
Ilonga village: 2010 0.002 
 
(0.036) 
Total land holdings (ha): 2010 0.007 
 
(0.026) 
Value of household asset (1000 USD) 0.034 
 
(0.027) 
Number of adult household members: 2010 -0.007 
 
(0.012) 
Years of schooling of household head: 2010 -0.001 
 
(0.007) 
Female household head (dummy): 2010 -0.030 
 
(0.046) 
Age of household head: 2010 -0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Constant 0.058 
 
(0.087) 
  Observations 387 
Adjusted R-squared 0.220 
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Abstract(in Japanese) 
要約 
 
本研究はマイクロクレジット （小規模無担保融資）が稲作技術の採用および生産性に
与える影響をタンザニアで行われたランダム化比較実験のデータを用いて検証する。
世界的なマイクロクレジット機関である BRAC と共同で農業向けのマイクロクレジッ
トをランダムに選択された農家に提供し、intention-to-treatment effect (ITT) お
よび local average treatment effect (LATE) の推計を行った。その結果、マイクロ
クレジットは化学肥料投入量、単位面積当たりの収量および収益に統計的に有意な影
響を与えないことが分かった。さらに、比較的よく整備された灌漑地区とそうでない
灌漑地区を比べた結果、比較的よく整備された灌漑施設では、もともとある程度肥料
投入量が多く、農家はクレジットを用いても施肥量を増やさないことが明らかになっ
た。また、灌漑の整備が十分でない地区では、近代品種の普及が進んでおらず、肥料
反応性が低いため、クレジットによって施肥量は増えるが、それが生産性の大幅な向
上にはつながっていないことが示された。実験以前に農業研修を受けたことがある農
家とそうでない農家の比較においても、同様の結果が確認された。 
 
キーワード：マイクロクレジット、技術普及、農業、タンザニア、アフリカ 
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